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Abstract
Who should have a right to participate in a polity’s decision-making?Although the answers to
this ‘boundary problem’ in democratic theory remain controversial, it is widely believed that
the enfranchisement of tourists and children is unacceptable. Yet, the two most prominent
inclusion principles in the literature – Robert Goodin’s ‘all (possibly) affected interests’-
principle and the ‘all subjected to law’-principle – both enfranchise those groups. Unsurpris-
ingly, democratic theorists have therefore offered several reasons for nonetheless exempting
tourists and children from the franchise. In this paper, I argue that their attempts fail. None of
the proposed rationales can do the job without having unacceptable implications for the
voting rights of other groups. I then develop a new specification of the affected interests-view,
one that avoids such problems. According to my life plan-principle, a person is entitled to
participate in a polity’s decision-making if and only if its decisions will actually affect her
autonomously chosen life plans, or prevent her from developing or revising plans of that kind.
I show that this principle straightforwardly avoids enfranchising tourists and children, and
thus improves upon its two prominent rivals. The paper ends by considering and rejecting two
objections to my new principle.
Keywords Votingrights .Boundaryproblem.Democratic theory.Enfranchisement .All-affected
. All-subjected . Life plans . Personal autonomy
1 Introduction
For any democratic form of government, laws are determined through a process that respects
the will of ‘the demos’. But how do we define the demos? The answers to this ‘boundary
problem’ in democratic theory typically fall into two categories. According to the first, a
person should have a say in a polity’s decision-making1 if and only if its decisions affect her
interests. Robert Goodin defends the arguably most prominent version of the affected interests-
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view. According to his all (possibly) affected interests principle (AAP), voting rights should be
distributed to “all interests possibly affected by any possible decision under any possible
agenda” (2007: 55). AAP is extremely inclusive: tearing down “boundaries both of space and
time”, it proposes that “[v]irtually (maybe literally) everyone in the world – and indeed
everyone in all possible future worlds – should be entitled to vote on any proposal or any
proposal for proposals” (2007: 55). According to the other category, a person should have a
say in a polity’s decision-making if and only if she is subjected to them. Claudio López-Guerra
defends a typical version of this view. According to his all subjected (to law) principle (ASP),
“anyone who is subject to the laws of a democratic polity should be included in the citizen
body” (2005: 221).2 For López-Guerra, a person is subjected only if the relevant laws can be
coercively enforced against her. In a system of territorially defined sovereign states, this means
that states only subject people within their respective territories.3
Although AAP and ASP have become prominent in the literature, they fail to support what
many regard as the intuitively correct pattern of enfranchisement in two hard cases. As we
shall see, AAP and ASP both imply that tourists and children are entitled to vote. Because
democratic theorists widely share the intuition against enfranchising those groups (Whitt
2017: 296), they need to find “exceptions to the rule [which] may be independently justified”
(Whitt 2017: 293).4 In this paper’s first main part, I argue that several recent attempts to justify
exceptions for tourists and children are unsatisfactory. In addition to being more or less ad hoc,
the proposed rationales have unacceptable implications for the voting rights of various other
groups. In the paper’s second main part, I develop and defend a refinement of the affected
interests-view that avoids these problems. According to my new principle of voting rights, a
person is enfranchised on a polity’s decision if and only if that decision will affect her
autonomously chosen life plans or prevent her from developing or revising plans of that kind.
I shall refer to this inclusion principle as the life plan principle (LPP).5
As I understand them, AAP, ASP and LPP give alternative accounts of a normative ideal.
They purport to provide a fixed point against which different practical decision methods might
be critically assessed in accordance with how well they approximate that ideal (Arrhenius
2005: 4–5). Following a common view, I take the relevant ideal to be democratic legitimacy;
unless a decision is made by a demos constituted according to the relevant principle, that
decision is democratically illegitimate.6
The paper unfolds as follows. Sections 2–3 show that AAP and ASP, as their proponents
have thus far developed them, must either counterintuitively enfranchise tourists and children,
2 For similar versions, see Beckman (2009: 47–50), Owen (2010), Erman (2014), Whitt (2017).
3 Some ASP-proponents controversially reject this enforcement-requirement. For them, exposure to a state’s
coercive threats is sufficient for subjectedness. Border laws, e.g., might thus subject extraterritorially (Abizadeh
2008).
4 It is common to treat pre-theoretical considered judgments, or ‘intuitions’, about more or less imaginary cases
as relevant input when assessing normative principles. When a principle’s implications fit our intuitions, this
gives pro tanto support for it, and vice versa. Proponents of AAP and ASP generally follow that method, and I
shall do the same. That is arguably justified, as I aim to assess AAP and ASP on their own terms, and to defend a
principle that improves upon them. Although the use of moral intuitions is arguably inevitable in political
philosophy (Elster 2011), it is controversial whether they are truth-apt.
5 I presently bracket the questions of what kind and amount of influence that a relevantly affected person should
have (Arrhenius 2018: 104–108). I assume that influence refers to voting rights. Moreover, I take no stand on
whether a person’s amount of influence corresponds to her degree of affectedness. I intend my analysis to be
compatible with weighted and unweighted versions of LPP. For an analysis of affected interests-views and
weighted voting, see Brighouse and Fleurbaey (2010).
6 See e.g. Abizadeh (2008), Owen (2012), Miklosi (2012), Lampert (2015), and Whitt (2017).
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or allow similarly counterintuitive results for the voting rights of several other groups. In Sect.
4, I put forward my new specification of the affected interests-view. I first expose LPP’s
normative foundation in a widely recognized value: personal autonomy. I then explicate key
parts of LPP’s formulation. This includes showing (in Sect. 5) why LPP avoids the extreme
inclusiveness of AAP – a feature that many regard as a reductio of the latter (Goodin 2016:
367–368). Section 6 shows how LPP is able to accommodate our intuitions about tourists and
children in a non-ad hoc manner. That ability, however, might come at a price. In order to
exclude tourists and children, I made LPP significantly more restrictive than AAP, and that
might risk pushing LPP towards under-inclusiveness. Section 7 considers and rejects an
objection along such lines. Section 8 addresses a different worry: that LPP’s enfranchisement
patterns might accentuate socioeconomic injustice. The paper ends with a conclusion.
2 AAP and ASP on Tourists
To clarify what AAP and ASP imply for the enfranchisement of short-term transients, consider
The Tourist: Donald, a US citizen, is on a short vacation in Mexico, where he is enjoying
the bars, restaurants and beaches of Cancun. In a few weeks, he will travel back to the
US.
Should Donald have a say over the Mexican laws that apply to him during his vacation? The
common intuitive response is presumably negative. That answer, however, sits uncomfortably
with AAP. After all, Donald is clearly affected by laws regulating the opening hours on
restaurants and bars, the maintenance of beaches, etc. If so, AAP will enfranchise him on such
policies. Moreover, insofar as the laws regulating virtually any other policy area will also
possibly affect his interests, AAP would give him a say on those as well. From AAP’s
viewpoint, Donald’s general say on Mexican decisions is solid.
The inclusion of tourists is widely thought to follow also on ASP: whenever a person is
present within a polity’s territory, she is subject to its legal system; if subjectedness grounds
enfranchisement, tourists should be entitled to vote (Bauböck 2009: 480; Beckman 2009: 82).
Some ASP-proponents, however, have sought to challenge that implication. According to
López-Guerra, tourists “can be rightfully excluded since they would otherwise be electing
decision-makers whose resolutions would not be binding on them later” (2005: 226). That
reply is insufficient. It cannot explain why ASP does not simply enfranchise tourists prior to
their arrival – giving them a say over laws that will subject them when they arrive.
In a recent work, López-Guerra tries a different response. To avoid enfranchising tourists,
he qualifies ASP as follows: to be enfranchised, a person must be “regularly subject to the
legal system of a political unit” (2014: 97). The rationale behind this qualification is that “even
though tourists are subject to the legal system of the polity they visit, their lives are not
governed by it” (López-Guerra 2014: 98). Citing a similar reason for “exempting short-term
resident non-citizens from the all-subjected principle”, Matt Whitt writes that transients “are
not subject to the laws of the land in the same way as citizens and long-term residents, whose
lives – and not merely their travels – are governed by the laws on an ongoing basis” (2017:
297). If we interpret this proposal literally, the idea here seems to be that a person’s
enfranchisement depends upon the extent to which the state’s laws influence, or ‘govern,’
how she leads her life. Call this the differential-life-governance-proposal.
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I doubt that the differential-life-governance proposal will be satisfactory for ASP-propo-
nents. Note first the ambiguity involved in having one’s life ‘governed’ by a set of laws. A
polity’s laws typically govern a person’s life both positively and negatively. It governs
positively by providing her with certain opportunities which would be unavailable without
those laws (e.g. paid parental leave, affordable student loans, etc.), and which she may or may
not prefer pursuing. Negatively, the laws govern a person’s life by constraining access to
options she may want to pursue but which the law forbids (e.g. withholding taxes, jaywalking,
exacting blood revenge, etc.). The opportunity-side of the equation arguably imposes the exact
same degree of ‘governance’ on persons A and B insofar as they qualify for the same public
benefits (regardless of A’s and B’s preferences for making use of them). On the negative side,
however, the law seems to ‘govern’ A’s life relatively more than B’s, simply if it forbids more
of A’s preferred options than it does B’s, all else being equal. On this understanding of
‘governance’, it becomes unattractive to qualify ASP according to the differential-life-
governance variable. ASP would then imply that people with criminal intent have a stronger
claim to the franchise than people who feel no urge to break the law, all else being equal. After
all, the former’s lives are relatively ‘more governed’ by the law because a larger part of their
behavioral preferences are frustrated.
The differing-life-governance proposal also risks inadvertently expanding the franchise
across territorial borders. That would be unwelcome for ASP-proponents, who typically
applaud ASP’s alleged ability to avoid extra-territorial expansion of the franchise (Whitt
2017: 293; see also Goodin 2016). However, if ASP (in its modified version) enfranchises
people according to the law’s effect on how people conduct their lives – not according to
whether it purports to bind them – it is unclear why we should measure those effects only
within the polity’s borders. It seems descriptively accurate that a polity’s laws typically
‘govern’ the lives of non-transients relatively more than the lives of transients. The lives of
permanent residents in Miami are generally, to use Whitt’s phrase, more “constrained by the
coercive power of the [US]” (2017: 298), than a German tourist visiting South Beach for a
week. However, if the crucial difference between them is how US laws constrain how they
lead their lives, one might wonder why large numbers of Cubans, Mexicans, and others
(around the globe), should not be enfranchised in US decision-making. The differential-life-
governance-proposal is unattractive for ASP-proponents.
But perhaps we could interpret the López-Guerra-Whitt proposal differently. On an alter-
native reading, what matters is simply how long you are subjected to the state’s laws,
regardless of the extent to which those laws influence how you live. Call this the temporal-
subjection-proposal. On the temporal-subjection-proposal, ASP may clearly disenfranchise
tourists in many cases. After all, very many of a state’s laws have long-term application, and
will continue to subject the state’s residents for years after a short-term tourist has left its
territory. If we require, say, one-year-subjection to a law for a person to have a say on it, this
will disenfranchise most tourists in practice. However, we can easily imagine cases – of short-
term decisions – where the temporal-subjection-proposal cannot avoid counterintuitively
enfranchising short-term transients. Consider the following modified Donald-example:
Mexican Referendum: As it happens, Donald’s visit to Cancun coincides with a peculiar
referendum. After discovering electoral irregularities, the Mexican National Electoral
Institute has scheduled a new election shortly. In the meantime, the referendum asks
whether policies passed after the fraudulent election should be immediately declared null
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and void – thereby reinstating old laws – or whether they shall remain in effect until the
new election is held (say, in three weeks).
In this example, Donald stays in Mexico (or so we may assume) for the full duration of the
decision’s application. Because the referendum decision thus subjects him in the exact same
way as it subjects any resident Mexican, ASP enfranchises them both. Yet the counter-
intuitiveness of giving him a say presumably lingers on.
Apart from counter-intuitive results in cases of short-term decisions, the temporal-
subjection-proposal faces the challenge of identifying a threshold of sufficient temporal
subjectedness for longer-term decisions. For one thing, it is hard to see how such a threshold
can be identified non-arbitrarily. Moreover, regardless of where we make the cutoff, cases of
counter-intuitive exclusions and/or inclusions – above or below the threshold – will presum-
ably be rife. The temporal-subjection proposal seems highly problematic.
Some believe that our intuitions about tourists might change if we reject a strictly
dichotomous voting-scheme. Rather than distributing the franchise such that people have
equally weighty votes or none at all, we could give tourists a partial say in a weighted
voting-scheme. David Owen believes that this solves ASP’s tourism-challenge. Owen starts by
conceding the initial problem:
[I]t is simply counter-intuitive to include transients in the demos as political equals
alongside non-transients whose subjection to the decisions of the polity is (in certain
respects at least) more consequential in virtue of being of greater temporal duration as
well as, typically, more encompassing with regard to the various dimensions of their life
(2012: 146, my emphases).
He then claims that the counter-intuitiveness of enfranchising transients “dissolves” if we give
transients less voting power than non-transients. According to Owen, this can be done by
weighting a person’s voting power in state S according to “the scope, degree and temporal
extent of [her] subjection” to S’s laws (2012: 147). However, if ASP incorporates a weighted
voting-scheme along the lines of Owen’s proposal, this will produce various counterintuitive
results in other domains. Note first that two of the variables Owen offers – ‘scope’ and ‘degree’
– are problematic as indicators of differential subjectedness. For reasons already given (in my
discussion of the ‘differential-life-governance’ proposal), they will have unacceptable impli-
cations for the voting rights of various other groups (e.g. by decreasing the voting power of
law-abiding individuals compared to those with criminal intent, all else equal). This leaves
‘temporal duration’ as the only potentially plausible basis for voting weight differentiation in
Owen’s proposal.
If ASP incorporates a time-sensitive criterion, it might straightforwardly ascribe more
voting weight to non-transients.7 However, this modified version of ASP would produce
counterintuitive results for sub-groups of non-transients in other cases. For example, all else
being equal, it would imply that non-transient women, due to their longer life expectancy,
should generally have weightier votes than non-transient men should. If we find such upshots
unacceptable, Owen’s proposal is not a satisfactory solution to the problem of counterintui-
tively enfranchising transients (on equal terms with non-transients). A scheme that weights
7 A weighted criterion might avoid the temporal-duration-proposal’s arbitrary cutoff points.
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votes according to the duration of people’s subjectedness might well create more problems
than it solves.
3 AAP and ASP on Children
Let us now explore what AAP and ASP imply for the enfranchisement of minors. Consider
The Child: four-year old Louise likes cars. She wants to obtain a driver’s license and to
earn enough money to buy a vehicle. According to the law, however, she is too young –
both for driving and wage-labor. Louise disapproves. She wants the rules to change.
Be that as it may. It is nonetheless counter-intuitive to enfranchise small children like Louise,
even on these two policy areas only. AAP would disagree, though. Louise’s interests are
clearly affected by the relevant laws, and she is therefore enfranchised on them. Moreover,
because we may presumably construe virtually any law as having possible effects on her
interests, AAP would even enfranchise Louise in general elections.
ASP has the same implication. Like other residents, Louise is subjected to the laws of the
polity under which she lives. According to one influential democratic theorist, the upshot is
that Louise’s “right to vote in the democratic process” follows from ASP “for exactly the same
reason as the right to vote for adults does” (Beckman 2009: 99). Not surprisingly, many ASP-
proponents have sought to exempt (at least very young) children from the franchise. Speaking
of “a two-year old child” and “a person with severe brain-damage”, López-Guerra invokes a
competence-rationale in order to explain why they should not be allowed to vote: such people
are “incapable of understanding what an election of representatives is about” (2005: 226).
Now, although imposing a competence-requirement might well be independently plausible, it
is unclear how it follows from ASP itself. In Ludvig Beckman’s view, himself an ASP-
proponent, such a rationale would clearly be in ‘tension’ with the principle (2009: 119).
Assuming arguendo that the competence-requirement is at least compatible with ASP, it is
still unclear why invoking it is not simply an ad hoc solution. Having to resort to ad hoc
hypotheses is not, I believe, a decisive problem. However, in general, such moves arguably
reduce a view’s overall plausibility.8
Matt Whitt, another ASP-proponent, mentions an exemption-rationale with a less ad hoc-
flavor: a reason for why “children are typically exempted from the all-subjected principle”
could be that “they are not subject to the law in the same way as adults (their legal obligations
differ)” (2017: 296). Whitt does not elaborate this ‘differing obligations’-rationale. To assess it
we therefore need to consider some alternative readings. First, the legal obligations of children
and adults might differ in that children have only negative obligations (to refrain from certain
actions, e.g. shoplifting), whereas adults also have positive obligations (to perform certain
actions, e.g. paying taxes). On this version, the differing obligations-rationale would counter-
intuitively imply that unemployed people have relatively weaker claims to enfranchisement
than those who pay income taxes, all else being equal. On a second interpretation, what
generally distinguishes children from adults is that children have fewer legal obligations.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how we could make such a cut without, again, generating
unattractive inequalities between adults. If we differentiate people’s voting rights based on
8 They do so by reducing its syntactic simplicity (Baker 2016).
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their number of legal obligations, this implies, for example, that able-bodied workers have
stronger claims to voting rights than severely handicapped persons who have no legal
obligation to pay income taxes, all else being equal. As before, our intuitions, I take it, reject
such upshots. A third interpretation is that children are not prosecutable for breaches of legal
obligations whereas adults are. That idea might seem promising. After all, in most countries
criminal responsibility does not start until (early) adolescence. However, a state’s laws contain
much more than its criminal code. It is hard to imagine a (morally defensible) set of laws where
children enjoy no legal rights, for example. Whenever they have such rights, the laws
specifying them do apply to the children, and ASP implies granting them a say in their
making. So, insofar as Whitt’s aim, as he writes, is to explain why children are ‘exempted’
from ASP (not merely partially disenfranchised), appealing to differing criminal responsibility
is insufficient. The differing-obligations-rationale fails.
It is time to take stock. Our analysis has thus far shown that AAP and ASP run counter to
our intuitions about the enfranchisement of tourists and children, and that several recent
attempts to exempt these groups are unsatisfactory. The exemption-rationales cannot avoid
creating unattractive results in other domains. Without claiming that this critical analysis is
conclusive, I now turn to a more constructive task. In what follows, I aim to develop and
defend an alternative inclusion principle that overcomes these problems.
4 A New Specification of Affected Interests: The Life Plan Principle
According to the
Life Plan Principle (LPP): A person is entitled to participate in a polity’s decision-
making if and only if its decisions will actually affect her autonomously chosen (actual
and central) life plans, or prevent her from developing or revising plans of that kind.
LPP rests upon the belief that being the author of one’s own life is morally important.9
Personal autonomy is the more fundamental value which explains why people have a weighty
interest in influencing decisions which affect their (ability to freely develop, revise or sustain)
projects and pursuits. Many believe that the value of personal autonomy may plausibly justify
democratic governance itself (Waldron 2012: 195–196).10 I shall remain agnostic on that issue.
My present concern is how the value of personal autonomy may help identify the boundaries
of the demos.
There are three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for personal autonomy.11 First, a
person must have sufficient internal capacity for autonomy, in the form of certain mental
abilities to draw upon when making her choices. An autonomous person is capable of
rationally fitting means to ends. Moreover, she is capable of reflecting critically upon her
options, and of making her choice in light of her ‘own viewpoint’. As one writer puts it, she
must “have attitudes that manifest her own evaluative outlook” and be able “to guide herself in
9 I presently assume the moral importance of autonomy. For a defense, see Raz (1986).
10 Others believe that, although a person’s interest in autonomy may be decisive in various private matters (where
it is possible for her to be sovereign), this is not transferable to democratic decisions, because no single voter can
be sovereign in irreducibly collective decisions whenever preferences among the electorate differ (Christiano
1996: 19).
11 Here I largely follow Raz (1986: 154–155; 372–378).
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light of these attitudes over time” (Betzler 2015: 69).12 Second, she must have sufficient
external capacity for autonomy, in the form of an adequate (i.e. varied and meaningful) range
of options from which to choose. Third, once her autonomous choices are made, she must be
permitted to pursue them without interference. If one or more of these conditions are breached,
autonomy is not preserved. Respect for autonomy’s three conditions is reflected in LPP. LPP
enfranchises a person on a polity’s decisions whenever they affect her autonomy. This can
happen because the laws affect her autonomously chosen plans (the third condition) or prevent
her from acquiring or sustaining the capacity to make and revise such plans – by hampering
her mental abilities (the first condition) or by restricting her access to an adequate set of options
(the second condition).
There are two constraints on the type of plans covered by LPP. First, LPP enfranchises
people on decisions that affect plans they actually have. Possible plans – plans that people
could have endorsed, but which they nevertheless are not committed to when the political
decision is made – do not count. The reason for this constraint is that non-interference with a
person’s possible plans is not required to preserve her autonomy. For most people, option sets
change continuously. This may be due to “social, economic and technological processes
[which] are constantly changing the opportunities available in our society” (Raz 1986: 411).
If a particular opportunity is eliminated, the effect is much more serious for people who are
already committed to that opportunity:
[D]enying a person the possibility of carrying on with his projects […] is preventing him
from having the life he has chosen. A person who may but has not yet chosen the
eliminated option is much less seriously affected. Since all he is entitled to is an adequate
range of options the eliminated option can, from his point of view, be replaced by
another without loss of autonomy (Raz 1986: 411).
So, concerning the importance of non-interference (the third condition), the life plans that
matter for preservation of autonomy, and hence for LPP, are the plans people are actually
committed to. Possible commitments are irrelevant.
The second constraint is this. LPP enfranchises people only on decisions affecting their
autonomously chosen central life plans (or their ability to develop and revise plans of that
kind). Plans qualify as central in our lives if they “organize many choices, and are fundamental
to our sense of our lives as our own”; this sets them apart from our ‘everyday choices’, which
we make “in part because they contribute to the achievement of more abstract, pervasive [i.e.
central] aims” (Stilz 2013: 336–337). Like the first constraint, the rationale for this centrality-
constraint is found by considering LPP’s foundational value. As Raz makes clear, a person’s
autonomy is only interfered with when she is prevented from developing and pursuing
“pervasive goals, projects or relationships” (1986: 409–410). For example, while a person’s
autonomy is clearly diminished if she is denied the option of having an education, the same is
not true when a certain brand of ice cream is made unavailable to her. Although a person may
prefer to eat a particular ice cream brand, doing so is (typically) not central, or ‘pervasive’,
enough in her life for its unavailability to raise concerns about violation of autonomy.
It is worth underlining that, on my account, a plan might be central without having long
duration. For some theorists, a ‘life plan’ refers to a fully worked out long-term scheme,
12 This account of internal capacity is deliberately rough, because I intend LPP to be compatible with various
views. For an overview of the debate, see Buss and Westlund (2018).
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identifying the best path through a structurally complex set of all foreseeable choice-situations
that a person might encounter during her whole life (Rawls 1999: 358–361). I have no such
grandeur in mind. From LPP’s viewpoint, the moral significance of life plans flow from the
value of personal autonomy. An autonomous person might sometimes simply change her
mind, act out of character, or even decide to live without long-term plans whatsoever.13 As Raz
writes, “[p]eople usually control their lives not by deciding once and for all what to do for the
rest of their lives. Rather they take successive decisions, with the later ones sometimes
reversing earlier decisions, sometimes further implementing them, and often dealing with
matters unaffected by the earlier decisions” (1986: 374, n. 1). As a rule of thumb, aside from
the two constraints I have mentioned, what matters for LPP is how a person chooses her plans,
not what content she gives them.
Note also that, although development of and changes in life plans might typically be
gradual (with more significant changes presumably requiring relatively longer time-spans),
there is no necessity about this. A person could experience a sudden and radical change in how
she wants to lead her life. She might decide, for example, to change her professional career
overnight. If so, several political decisions that were once immaterial to her life might suddenly
become crucially important for her new projects.14 Others might no longer affect her at all.
LPP tracks these developments – giving her a say on all and only those political decisions that
affect her (ability to live a) self-chosen life.
5 Two Crucial Differences Between LPP and AAP
As mentioned, Goodin’s AAP is extremely inclusive. Apart from enfranchising tourists and
children, it identifies virtually global demoi for almost any decision taken anywhere. Most find
that inclusiveness strongly counterintuitive. I have therefore aimed to make LPP much more
restrictive. Two crucial differences between LPP and AAP help me achieve this. First, while
AAP seems to include any interest, LPP only refers to people’s interest in leading an
autonomous life. In fairness to Goodin, he writes that AAP might need various “fine-tunings”
before it is applied. These will “perhaps” include differentiated voting weights in proportion to
the degree to which people’s otherwise similar interests are affected, and a ranking of interests
in accordance with their moral importance (Goodin 2007: 51). Yet, he does leave AAP
unspecified in these respects.
We could try to second-guess which restrictions on relevant interests Goodin might favor.
However, regardless of where he would draw the line, those restrictions will presumably have
little if any effect on AAP’s inclusiveness. The reason is that AAP, as we have seen,
enfranchises all possibly affected interests. This feature is the second important difference
13 An anonymous reviewer asks whether LPP may enfranchise people who lack the “well-structured, hierarchi-
cally organized [Rawlsian] scheme”, yet have “several smaller-scale ambitions”, or simply are “drifters without
any clear direction or shape to their lives”. LPP normally enfranchises such people, at least on various decisions.
Imagine a person who has chosen to organize her life for, say, no more than six months ahead. Whatever she
plans to do during that period, it is presumably affected if her landlord can evict her overnight without notice.
Unless she (outlandishly) plans to be dogged around by whatever decisions others make, LPP will give her a say
on the state’s tenancy laws – and presumably many others. (Policy-interconnectedness might also expand her
enfranchisement. See Sect. 7.)
14 This relation between the passage of time and life plan-based enfranchisement sets LPP apart from the ASP-
related ‘temporal-duration-proposal’ considered in Sect. 2, where a person’s enfranchisement is a simple function
of how long she is subjected to the law.
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between AAP and LPP. LPP only enfranchises actually affected interests. If it were to replace
‘actually’ with ‘possibly’, LPP would collapse into AAP. LPP’s more restricted account of
relevant interests would then make little difference for the following reason. It is arguably
conceivable that whatever decision made by whichever polity will possibly affect the relevant
life plans (or the ability to make and revise such plans) of virtually anyone anywhere. As long
as we make the causal chain long enough and consider all possible worlds, that upshot seems
unavoidable. But if this is true for a ‘possibilistic’ formulation of LPP, it presumably means
that AAP would imply global enfranchisement regardless of any restrictions Goodin might
introduce to his theory’s account of relevant interests. The key to AAP’s extreme implications
is its possibilistic formulation, not its (more or less restrictive) account of relevant interests.
Before moving on, let me address an apparent objection to the kind of ‘actualistic’
formulation I favor. The idea is that actualistic affected interest-views are incoherent for the
following reason. In order to know whom to enfranchise on a decision, we must first know
who will actually be affected by its outcome; and we cannot know the outcome prior to the
decision. In Goodin’s words, an actualistic principle “is unable to tell us who is entitled to vote
on a decision until after the very decision has been decided” (2007: 52). However, this
objection overlooks the distinction between being affected by the outcome and by the choice
situation itself. In order to determine whether people’s interests are affected by a decision
between options O1, O2, and O3, it is sufficient to establish that their interests will be affected
by the choice of O1, or O2, or O3. As David Owen puts it, “[h]ow their interests will be
affected cannot be determined prior to the outcome, but that their interests will be affected in
one way or another can be determined before the outcome is decided” (2012: 133; see also
Arrhenius 2018).
Although Owen’s reply is fine as far as it goes, it cedes a lot of ground to Goodin’s
incoherence-objection. Goodin objects to actualistic affected interests-views by claiming that
they cannot (logically) work as formulas for devising a practical decision-method. Owen
replies by demonstrating that they can. He shows that there is no logical contradiction involved
in using the affected interests-view for that purpose. However, I think there is another, more
fundamental, rejoinder to Goodin’s objection. That rejoinder denies that actualistic affected
interests-views aim to devise a practical decision-method in the first place. We may understand
AAP, ASP and LPP as candidate formulations of a normative ideal (e.g. the ideal of
democratic legitimacy). They provide us with a yardstick for evaluating practical decision-
methods in terms of how well they approximate that ideal. If so, Goodin’s objection is
misguided. It equivocates on the distinction between principles as ideals and principles as
practical decision-methods, and holds actualistic affected interests-views to a ‘practicability’-
standard that they do not intend to meet. Moreover, Goodin does not hold his own AAP to the
same standard. He clearly regards AAP as a normative ideal, not a decision-method blueprint.
As he writes, AAP might well be “wildly impractical”, so “we need to begin thinking what
arrangements might best approximate that ideal in some practice that is feasible” (2007: 64).
There might be various epistemic challenges related to determining whether a person’s
interest in personal autonomy will actually be affected by a specific choice situation. Before we
can be sure about having enfranchised the correct set of people, we might have to wait until the
decision is made – by a potentially incorrect demos. However, that does not undermine LPP as
an ideal. It only means that when we implement LPP, we will normally have to accept some
uncertainty about whether our practical decision-method fully approximates that ideal princi-
ple. Sometimes we might predict quite well. Other times we might not. The ideal nonetheless
remains the same.
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To be clear, I am not claiming that it is irrelevant, for the general evaluation of ideals, to what
extent an ideal’s implementation is practically difficult. Taking a stand on that topic falls outside
this paper’s scope. Let me only note that it is not merely actualistic affected interests-view (like
LPP) which might have a hard time determining the exact boundaries of the ideal demos in
practice. Even AAP can be expected to face difficult epistemic challenges. Unless it is always the
case that anyone is possibly affected by any decision, AAP must distinguish between those with
and those without possibly affected interests. And it is presumably very difficult to draw the exact
line between those groups in practice. This suggests that practicability arguably favors none of the
said inclusion principles in particular, regardless of the importancewe ascribe to that desideratum.15
To sum up, my version of the affected interests-view recommends significantly less
inclusive enfranchisement patterns than AAP. Two features of LPP secure this result. First,
and most importantly, I formulated LPP in actualistic terms. Second, I restricted the set of
relevant interests to people’s interest in personal autonomy, which further reduces LPP’s
inclusiveness. We may now assess whether LPP disenfranchises the two groups who caused
problems for AAP and ASP.
6 LPP on Tourists and Children
LPP straightforwardly excludes Donald in The Tourist and Mexican Referendum. The relevant
decisions do not affect his actual and central life plans nor prevent him from autonomously
reordering his life. LPP implies the same for tourists generally. Imagine that Norway closes its
borders for travelers. Although Norway is a decent tourist spot, that decision is no life changer for
those who no longer have the option of marveling at the midnight sun, or enjoying (if that’s the
right word) the infamous ‘lutefisk’ in its traditional surroundings. For those who had not yet
planned to visit Norway, removing that option from the feasible set is no threat to their external
capacity for autonomy. Other interesting places abound. For those who had already planned a trip
to Norway, going there is presumably not a central part of their life plans. For most, their pursuits
may continue in all significant respects. According to LPP, those tourists have no say in Norwegian
(tourism) decisions. However, there is a tipping point here. Imagine a German tourist who becomes
enamored with Lofoten, and plans to visit ever more frequently and for longer periods each time.
Her central life plans start to revolve more and more around her activities in this part of Northern
Norway. At some point, her autonomously chosen projects have become equally divided between
Germany and Norway. In this case, LPP may enfranchise her in both states. (She would be
enfranchised not only on tourism decisions, of course, but also on other decisions affecting her life
in the two countries.) Over time, the scales might tip, such that her plans start to revolve more
dominantly around one place. Consequently, she might be disenfranchised in the other.16
15 ASP also faces such practicability-concerns. Consider, e.g., the difficulty of predicting who exactly will visit a
polity as tourists, whether current demos-members will move abroad or die before the laws they have authored
are implemented, etc. Those challenges are presumably as daunting as those facing affected interests-views.
16 Note what this implies for expatriates. For LPP, expatriates might retain their right to participate in the
decisions of the country they have left. Like the German in Lofoten, this depends upon whether they retain plans
affected by those decisions. In contrast, ASP is typically believed to categorically disenfranchise expatriates
(López-Guerra 2005), while AAP includes them on a (much) wider range of decisions than LPP. An anonymous
reviewer mentions another interesting case: “migrants who, due to the EU Dublin agreements, are indefinitely
stuck in a European country when their goal was to reach another country”. LPP enfranchises them on all and
only those decisions that affect their life plans (including the Dublin policy itself). In comparison, AAP and ASP
enfranchise them on a wider range of laws.
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LPP’s implication in The Child is also straightforward. Louise’s plans – to obtain a driver’s
license and a wage-paying job – fail to trigger LPP. The reason is that Louise does not (yet)
possess sufficient internal capacity for autonomy. In her case, the laws affect no autonomously
chosen life plans. Such plans do not yet exist. I intend that characterization of Louise to be
uncontroversial. As Amy Mullin writes:
One of the most important factors someone must have in order to act autonomously is
experience relating to the particular domain where autonomous action is called for.
Children [between three and eight] often lack relevant forms of knowledge and expe-
rience. They also typically lack the ability to understand and appreciate the long-term
effects of their decisions […] (Mullin 2007: 549).
It is hard to deny Mullin's description. Although internal capacity comes in degrees and
develops gradually (Rehfeld 2011), four-year old children are typically (far) too lacking
– both in means-end rationality and (especially) in critical reflection – to qualify as autono-
mous. This presumably holds regardless of where the threshold for sufficient capacity is
(plausibly) drawn. Louise is disenfranchised.
If it turns out that older children (e.g. ten-year-olds) are sufficiently autonomous,
concerning at least some political decisions, LPP enfranchises them on those decisions.17
Personally, I am happy with that result. My present concern is merely to show that LPP has a
non-ad hoc explanation for why small children (like Louise) should remain disenfranchised,
while AAP and ASP do not.18 The latter will regard children as relevantly affected or subjected
– and hence as enfranchised – regardless of their age.
I conclude that LPP straightforwardly explains our intuitions about tourists and (at least
small) children. Their disenfranchisement follows from LPP’s foundation in the value of
personal autonomy. The necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for living an autonomous
life yield a suitably restrictive account of relevant affectedness. However, although LPP’s
restrictiveness towards tourists and children might give it an edge over AAP and ASP, let us
now consider the opposite worry: whether it includes too few in other cases.
7 Under-Inclusion: (Too Many) ‘Non-Autonomy-Affecting’ Decisions?
Some laws routinely made by democratic states might seem to have little if any effect on
people’s autonomy. Whether we drive on the left or the right side of the road, for example, is
apparently irrelevant for autonomy. LPP identifies no principled demos for truly ‘non-auton-
omy-affecting’ decisions. Some might regard that as an unattractive result (one whose
unattractiveness presumably increases with the number of such decisions, all else being equal).
In reply, let us first clarify the objection. It cannot concern theoretical inconsistency. The
objection cannot be that LPP fails to identify a demos for decisions which – from the
principle’s own perspective – do not engage the interests that ground enfranchisement. That
would hold for any inclusion principle. The objection is rather that: it is counter-intuitive not to
17 According to López-Guerra (2012: 136–137), “the best available evidence on moral and cognitive develop-
ment” indicates that ten-year olds are typically capable of understanding “the idea of electing representatives and
to adopt a position of their own, however rudimentary, on […] the alternatives at a given contest”.
18 LPP has similar implications for adults with intellectual disabilities. Their enfranchisement depends upon their
having sufficient internal capacity for autonomy.
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enfranchise people on non-autonomy-affecting decisions. Personally, I do not share that
intuition, and am happy to accept the relevant implication. But let us set that aside, and instead
consider three reasons to expect that states will typically make very few, if any, truly non-
autonomy-affecting decisions. If correct, that should largely dissolve the alleged problem.
First, if the state’s inhabitants have developed their ways of life within a somewhat stable
legal framework over time, it seems difficult to find decisions that do not affect the life plans of
at least some people. Imagine that the UK decides to harmonize their long-standing traffic rules
with the rest of the world. As part of this policy, people are required to scrap their old cars in
favor of new (subsidized) ones suitable for driving on the right. This apparently non-
autonomy-affecting decision would interfere with the central life plans of at least some people.
Passionate veteran car owners, for example, could no longer take their beloved cars for a spin,
and LPP would enfranchise them on the decision.
Second, in a modern large-scale state, the passing of any single law typically influences the
application of other existing laws, or the prospects for passing new ones. If the UK passes the
traffic harmonization-law, it must spend significantly on infrastructure modification and car
subsidization. Because those funds must come from somewhere, the traffic law-decision
significantly influences decisions within other sectors of UK society (e.g. health care or
education). It is easy to imagine that the number of people relevantly affected by those
decisions far exceeds those (few veteran car owners) directly affected by the traffic law-
decision itself. Consequently, due to the interconnectedness of various policies, we can expect
LPP to identify a significantly broader electorate on a decision that initially appeared to engage
the autonomy of relatively few. Presumably, a similar analysis is applicable to most of the
decisions made by democratic states.
Third, we may often regard policy decisions from several perspectives. At one level, the
traffic harmonization-decision is a merely practical one, concerning which side of the road to
use. However, it could also be seen as concerning the proper relationship between the UK and
Europe, where a decision to scrap left-side driving may influence British identity. Many
believe that individuals have autonomy-based reason to care about the development of the
collective identity of groups to which they belong (Miller 1995). Insofar as individuals care
about such developments, LPP may enfranchise even larger numbers on the traffic law-
decision.
Clearly, all this depends upon empirics – upon how much policy A influences the passing
of policy B, whether a person has developed this or that life plan, etc. Settling such issues is
beyond this theoretical article’s scope. However, even on moderate empirical assumptions, we
might push back quite significantly on the present objection. In practice, there will presumably
be few, if any, political decisions that have no effects on personal autonomy.
8 Transmitting Injustice?
Let us end by considering a more fundamental challenge to LPP. LPP (like affected interests-
views generally) enfranchises anyone whose relevant interests are affected by political deci-
sions. The problem is that the distribution of interests might be shaped by unjust factors. Take a
superrich person whose luxury lifestyle constantly brings her around the world. Due to her
plans’ global reach, she is enfranchised in many more countries than regular people are.
Assuming that socioeconomic inequalities of this magnitude are unjust, LPP implausibly
‘transmits’ socioeconomic injustice into the political domain.
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In response, note first that the objection – regardless of its merits – does not merely apply to
affected interests-views (like LPP and AAP). It also indicts ASP, which enfranchises the superrich
traveler in all the countries she visits.19 Second, and more fundamentally, we might reject the
‘transmitting injustice’-issue as a problem forAAP,ASP, andLPP qua ideal principles of democratic
inclusion in the first place. We might understand democracy (including its inclusion principle) in a
‘thick’ or ‘thin’ sense. On the thick view, democracy is meant to incorporate other values such as
justice. Injustice-transmission is then indeed problematic: inclusion principles that undermine values
that democracy is meant to incorporate must be revised. On the thin view, however, democracy does
not incorporate other values, and it might be overridden for the sake of promoting them.When they
conflict, we might simply insist on balancing our inclusion-principle against justice (or find some
other method of adjudication). As I read them, proponents of AAP or ASP do largely favor the thin
view.20 They would thus presumably reject the problem, as I do.
9 Conclusion
This article has defended a refined version of the affected interests-view of voting rights. I believe
LPP improves upon the most prominent principles in the literature – AAP and ASP – by
straightforwardly accommodating the intuition against enfranchising tourists and (small) children.
Although this does not settle the case for LPP, I hope to have done enough to establish it as an
alternative that warrants further consideration.
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